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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff's Gary A. Porter's appeal is from a final judgment 
(R. 132) of the Third Judicial District Court/ Salt Lake County/ 
enforcing a settlement agreement reached between the parties-
Mr. Porter filed his appeal in the Utah Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court assigned the appeal to this court pursuant to its 
statutory pour-over authority/ Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
This court has jurisdiction over cases assigned to it by the 
Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REYIEN 
AND STANDARDS OP REVIEW FOR EACH ISSUE 
A. 
The Summary Judgment Motion Issue 
Appellees West American Finance Corporation ("WAFCo") and 
Olympus Bank filed a motion for summary judgment (R. 23) to 
enforce a settlement agreement reached as the result of 
negotiations between appellees' attorney and the attorney then 
representing appellant Gary A. Porter. After first issuing a 
minute entry (R. 76)/ the trial court granted that motion. (R. 
108). 
The first issue to be determined is: In view of the 
affidavit and other admissible evidence before the trial court at 
the time it ruled on appellees' summary judgment motion to 
enforce a settlement between the parties/ did Mr. Porter present 
evidence which demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of 
material fact that would preclude an order enforcing the 
settlement. Mr. Porter did not file an affidavit in opposition 
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to appellees' motion. He did sign a verification/ attesting to 
the truth of certain factual assertions set forth in a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion. Therefore/ more specifically the 
issue is whether the "verification", not in affidavit form, 
turned those factual assertions into "evidence" and/ if so/ 
whether any of those factual assertions were sufficient to create 
a triable issue as to whether a settlement was actually reached 
by counsel for the parties. 
The title of the motion appellees filed was Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The relief asked for was summary judgment 
establishing appellees' accord and satisfaction affirmative 
defense. (R. 23). The matter was presented to the court as a 
summary judgment motion. The court ruled on it as a summary 
judgment motion/ finding that on the undisputed facts appellees 
had established that a settlement was agreed upon by counsel and 
finding that Mr. Porter did not present evidence sufficient to 
create a triable issue otherwise. (Minute Entry/ R. 76-81). 
The standard to be applied by a Utah appellate court when 
reviewing an order granting summary judgment is well established. 
A trial court should grant summary judgment only if no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. 
Co./ 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
The facts and inferences which can be drawn from the 
evidence presented to the trial court are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing a summary judgment motion. 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur./ 854 P.2d 527, 529 (Utah 1993). 
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Any doubt about whether a non-movant has established a genuine 
issue of material fact should be resolved in favor of the non-
movant. Butterfield v. OkubO/ 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). 
"In reviewing the record on any appeal from summary 
judgment/ we treat the statements and evidentiary materials of 
the appellant as if a jury would receive them as the only 
credible evidence, and we sustain the judgment only if no issues 
of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned." 
Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 750 P.2d 539/ 540 (Utah 
1988) [quoted in Zions First Nat. Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 
P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah 1988)]. 
While there are literally dozens of Utah appellate opinions 
which state the applicable standard in reviewing an order 
granting a summary judgment motion, this action has a twist. As 
stated, the substance of appellees' motion was to request that 
the trial find that a settlement had been reached and to enforce 
the settlement by requiring Mr. Porter to accept two checks 
tendered pursuant to that settlement agreement. Utah appellate 
courts have stated several times that "[t]he decision of a trial 
court to summarily enforce a settlement agreement will not be 
reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse of 
discretion." See Millerberg v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 
1. It is well settled that in characterizing a document, the 
court looks to the substance of the document, and not merely to 
its caption. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 
1064 (Utah 1991); Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555, 558 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
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1982); Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987); Zions 
First Nat, v. B. Jensen Interiors, 781 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989); 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
As stated in Zions First Nat, v. B. Jensen Interiors, supra: 
"Voluntary settlement of legal disputes is favored by 
the law and, under certain circumstances, a settlement 
agreement may be summarily enforced as an executory accord. 
See Mascaro v. Davis, [supra]. 'The decision of a trial 
court to summarily enforce a settlement agreement will not 
be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an 
abuse of discretion.1 Id. at 942 n. 11. Thus, we affirm 
the granting of a motion to compel settlement if the record 
establishes a binding agreement and 'the excuse for non-
performance is comparatively unsubstantial.' [Citations]." 
In Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 
605, 607 (Utah 1979), the opinion states: 
"It is now well established that the trial court has 
the power to summarily enforce on motion a settlement 
agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation 
is pending before it. Quite obviously, so simple and speedy 
a remedy serves well the policy favoring compromise, which 
in turn has made a major contribution to its popularity." 
It is also well established that an evidentiary hearing is 
not necessary to enforce a settlement agreement. Tracy-Collins 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, supra, 592 P.2d 605, 609; 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, supra, 866 P.2d at 586 n. 
2. This rule is consistent with the policy behind the doctrine 
of accord and satisfaction "to encourage the economical and 
efficient out-of-court settlement of disputes." Estate Landscape 
v. Mountain States, 844 P.2d 322, 328 (Utah 1992); Tesco American 
v. Lether, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 61, 62 (Utah App. 1994). 
These two principals—that when the evidence establishes a 
binding settlement agreement it may be summarily enforced, and 
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that no evidentiary hearing is necessary to summarily enforce a 
settlement agreement—when coupled with the policy in Utah 
favoring agreements of compromise/ suggest that some less 
stringent standard of review than that applied to orders granting 
summary judgment may be appropriate when reviewing an order 
finding and enforcing a settlement agreement. Appellees suggest 
that if upon review of the evidence before the trial court at the 
time it ruled on appellees1 motion/ this court finds the evidence 
that a settlement was reached to be compelling (even if not 
totally undisputed)/ it could apply the standard of review (if it 
does not apply an abuse of discretion standard as suggested by 
the cases cited above) suggested by Judge Orme in his dissent in 
Brown v. Brown/ 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987). In that case 
Judge Orme wrote: 
"The facts concerning whether appellant assented to the 
settlement would support a conclusion either way. After 
hearing the motion to enforce the settlement . . . the trial 
court made findings of fact to the effect that appellant was 
bound by the settlement. I concede/ however/ that those 
findings are not entitled to the usual deference because the 
court did not receive actual testimony. [Citation]. The 
court received affidavits and counsels1 representations 
about what the testimony would show. . . . We are in as 
good a position to review the affidavits and consider the 
proffer as was the trial court " 744 P.2d at 336. 
Appellees suggest that the public policy in favor of 
compromise settlements/ and the policy of resolving motions to 
enforce settlements economically and efficiently—as evidenced by 
the rule that motions to enforce settlements may be determined 
summarily and without an evidentiary hearing—would be advanced 
by application of such a standard in this case. This court can 
review the evidence which was before the trial court at the time 
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it ruled on appellees' summary judgment motion and/ if that 
evidence more readily supports a conclusion that counsel for each 
side agreed upon a settlement/ it can affirm the trial court's 
ruling. 
B. 
The "Motion for Reconsideration" Issue 
If the court determines that the trial court did not error 
when it granted appellees' summary judgment motion/ then an issue 
exists as to whether the trial court erred when it denied Mr. 
Porter's motion for reconsideration which was based on what 
Porter purported was "newly discovered evidence." 
Whether based on Rule 59(a) or Rule 60(b)/ Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure/ the granting or denying of a motion seeking 
relief from a judgment based on a claim of "newly discovered 
evidence" "is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be upset on appeal unless there is an abuse of 
discretion." Hall v. Fitzgerald/ 671 P.2d 224, 228-229 (Utah 
1983); Birch v. Birch/ 771 P.2d 1114/ 1117 (Utah App. 1989). 
The appellate court will presume the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion unless the record clearly shows the 
contrary. Donahue v. Intermountain Health Care/ Inc./ 748 P.2d 
1067, 1068 (Utah 1987); Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 
432, 433 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Appellees still contend that in response to their motion to 
the trial court, Mr. Porter did not present evidence sufficient 
to create a triable issue of fact. That contention is discussed 
in the Argument section of this Appellees' Brief, infra. 
6 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions/ statutes/ 
ordinances/ rules or regulations whose interpretation will be 
determinative of the issues raised by Mr. Porter's appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. 
Nature of the Case 
Gary Porter brought this action to foreclose on a mechanic's 
lien for excavation work performed by him at the site of 
construction of a condominium complex being built by appellee 
West American Finance Corporation. (Amended Complaint/ R. 8). 
Porter's cause of action against appellee Olympus Bank was to 
determine priority as between his mechanic's lien and a deed of 
trust from West American Finance/ as trustor/ to Olympus Bank/ as 
trustee and beneficiary. 
B. 
Course of Proceedings 
Gary Porter filed his complaint on April 22/ 1993 (R. 2), 
and filed an Amended Complaint on June 17/ 1993. (R. 8). 
After service of summons/ but before they file their answer/ 
appellees entered into settlement negotiations of Porter's 
claims. It is appellees' contention that the parties/ 
negotiating through their attorneys/ agreed upon a settlement. 
It is undisputed that two checks totalling $15/807.42 were 
tendered to Dale Dorius/ the attorney who was then representing 
Porter/ in full settlement of Porter's claims. The first check/ 
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for $15/591.42, was tendered on October 19/ 1993. The second 
check, for $216.00/ was tendered on November 12, 1993. 
On December 8/ 1993, Mr. Dorius wrote to appellees' attorney 
and, in appellees' opinion, reneged on the settlement previously 
agreed upon. (R. 44) 
On December 16, 1993, appellees' filed an answer to Porter's 
Amended Complaint. (R. 17). The answer alleged, as appellees' 
fourth affirmative defense, that appellees offered to pay and 
Porter agreed to accept, $15,807.42 in full and complete settle-
ment of his claims, and that West American Finance tendered two 
checks to Porter's attorney totalling $15,807.42, which tender 
was accepted, resulting in an accord and satisfaction of Porter's 
claims. (R. 19). 
On January 20, 1994, appellees' moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that as a matter of law the parties reached an 
accord and satisfaction of Porter's claims, as alleged in the 
Fourth Affirmative Defense. (R. 23). The motion was accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities (R. 25), and by the 
affidavit of appellees' attorney, Steven H. Lybbert. (R. 32). 
The affidavit identified and referred to several items of 
correspondence between Lybbert and Dale Dorius, copies of which 
were attached as exhibits to the affidavit. (R. 38-44). 
On January 28, 1994, Mr. Dorius sought to withdraw as 
Porter's attorney. (R. 51). 
On March 29, 1994, Porter (through his present attorney) 
filed a pleading entitled "Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 71). No affidavits were filed in 
8 
opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion/ but the 
••Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" contained 
a "Verification"/ signed under oath by Porter/ wherein he 
affirmed that he had "read the foregoing instrument and that 
based upon my personal knowledge the factual allegations 
3 
contained therein are true and correct." (R. 74). 
Appellees' filed their Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 67). Thereafter/ 
by a six-page minute entry dated April 1/ 1994 (R. 76-81/ and 
Addendum hereto)/ the court granted the summary judgment motion. 
On April 15/ 1994 (before a formal order granting the motion 
was entered)/ Porter filed a motion asking the court to 
reconsider its ruling. (R. 82). 
Appellees filed their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration on April 28/ 1994 (R. 97)/ 
and filed a notice to submit the motion for reconsideration for 
decision on May 5/ 1994. (R. 104). 
On May 20/ 1994, Porter filed a Reply to Defendants' 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. (R. 111). 
Accompanying the reply memorandum was Dale Dorius' affidavit in 
which Dorius asserted/ for the first time/ that there had not 
been a "finalized agreement" of settlement. (R. 119). 
3. Porter first filed his "Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment" on March 11, 1994 (R. 60)/ but the 
"Verification" was unsigned. He then filed the same pleading/ 
now signed by Mr. Porter/ on March 29/ 1994. 
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Appellees filed an objection to the reply memorandum based/ 
primarily/ on the untimeliness of Dale Dorius' affidavit. (R. 
121). Porter filed a reply to the objection on June 15/ 1994. 
(R. 127). 
By Minute Entry dated June 22/ 1994/ the court denied the 
motion for reconsideration. (R. 130). 
On July 18/ 1994 the court entered a formal order denying 
the motion for reconsideration (R. 134)/ and entered summary 
judgment for appellees. (R. 131). 
Porter filed a notice of appeal on August 15/ 1994. (R. 
138). 
C. 
Statement of Facts 
1. 
Those Facts Which Were Before the Trial Court 
When it Ruled on Appellees1 Summary Judgment Motion 
The affidavit of Steven Lybbert (R. 32-37) and the exhibits 
thereto (R.38-44) submitted to the trial court with appellees' 
summary judgment motion established the following facts which 
appellees contend were/ at the time the court ruled on the 
summary judgment/ undisputed: 
1. Following service of summonses upon appellees/ Stephen 
M. Harmsen/ president of appellee West American Finance/ Steven 
H. Lybbert/ appellees1 attorney, Mr. Porter/ and his attorney. 
Dale Dorius/ met at Lybbert's office to discuss settlement. The 
meeting took place on August 24, 1993. (Lybbert affidavit, 5T3/ 
R. 32-33). 
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2. At that meeting the parties reviewed invoices from 
Porter to West American's construction manager and discussed West 
American's claim that as a result of negligent overexcavation at 
the construction site/ it was necessary for West American to 
expend about $11/500 for extra shoring and extra engineering that 
would not have been necessary but for the alleged negligent over-
excavation. Mr. Harmsen expressed his willingness to settle 
Porter's mechanic's lien claim if a compromise could be reached 
as to an appropriate set off for that extra shoring and 
engineering. (Lybbert Affidavit/ H3/ R. 33). 
3. Following that meeting/ Dorius and Lybbert discussed 
settlement several times by telephone. On behalf of appellees/ 
Lybbert proposed that appellees pay the full amount of Porter's 
claim/ less a $3/135 set off for the extra shoring and engineer-
ing work/ less amounts billed by Porter to West American for 
amounts billed by Pioneer Trucking to Porter which had been paid 
directly by West American to Pioneer Trucking. (Lybbert 
affidavit/ 1F 4, R. 33) . 
4. That settlement offer was confirmed in a letter from 
Lybbert to Dorius which stated/ in part: 
"West American Finance Company is willing to pay $3/135 
less than the full amount of Mr. Porter's billings in full 
settlement of his action. I assume that means that West 
American would pay $22/465 less any amount it paid directly 
to Pioneer Trucking for amounts billed by Mr. Porter." 
(Exhibit "A" to Lybbert affidavit, R. 38). 
5. By letter from Dorius to Lybbert dated August 31/ 1993/ 
Dorius accepted the $3/135.00 setoff amount on the condition that 
West American pay interest from the date of filing the mechanic's 
11 
lien and attorney fees. (Exhibit "Bff to the Lybbert affidavit/ 
R. 39). 
6. After August 31/ Dorius and Lybbert negotiated by tele-
phone the remaining items of damages—a rate of interest on the 
principal amount to be paid by defendants/ and attorney fees. 
(Lybbert affidavit/ 1T 6, R. 34). 
7. By September 27, 1993/ Dorius and Lybbert had agreed 
that West American would pay 8% interest from the date the 
mechanic's lien was filed until the claim was paid. (Lybbert 
affidavit, 1T 7, R. 34) . 
8. A few days prior to October 19/ 1993/ Dorius advised 
Lybbert by telephone that Porter would accept the principal 
amount previously agreed upon (the amount of Porter's billings to 
West American less a $3/135 setoff/ less amounts paid by West 
American directly to Pioneer Trucking)/ plus 8% interest/ and 
that each side would assume his or its own attorney fees. 
(Lybbert affidavit/ IT 8, R. 34). 
9. On October 19, 1993/ Lybbert enclosed West American's 
check for $15/591.42 in a letter to Mr. Dorius. Enclosed with 
the letter and the check (and a notice of dismissal and a release 
of lien) was a sheet of paper entitled Gary Porter Settlement/ 
prepared by Stephen Harmsen of West American/ which contained the 
calculations as to how the amount of $15/591.42 was reached. 
(Exhibit "C" to the Lybbert affidavit/ R. 40). 
10. Sometime between October 19 and October 28/ 1993/ Dorius 
and Lybbert spoke by telephone. Dorius told Lybbert that Porter 
wanted verification of the amount paid by West American directly 
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to Pioneer Trucking. Dorius also stated that Porter had concerns 
about a few of the other amounts set forth on the sheet entitled 
"Gary Porter Settlement". A couple of invoice amounts as set 
forth on the "Gary Porter Settlement" calculation varied from the 
amounts on the actual invoi-ces. (Lybbert affidavit/ 1 10/ R. 34-
35). 
11. On October 28/ 1993/ Lybbert faxed a letter to Dorius 
with copies of the front and back of a check from West American 
payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel. In the letter/ Lybbert 
acknowledged his lack of understanding about the invoice amount 
variances set forth on the "Gary Porter Settlement" calculation 
and acknowledged that some further amount of money might be 
payable to "finally resolve this matter." Lybbert stated his 
intent to discuss those amounts with Stephen Harmsen when Harmsen 
returned from "out of town". (Exhibit "D" to the Lybbert 
affidavit/ R. 41). 
12. On November 5/ 1993 Lybbert faxed another letter to 
Dorius addressing the invoice amount variances/ and expressing 
his view that another $216.00 ($200 principal and $16 interest) 
as payable "in order to finally settle this matter." The letter 
also states: "Please consult with Mr. Porter. If that is 
acceptable/ please contact me and I will promptly forward a check 
in that amount." (Exhibit "E" to the Lybbert affidavit/ R. 42). 
13. Sometime between November 5 and November 11/ 1993/ 
Lybbert and Dorius again discussed the matter by telephone. 
Dorius instructed Lybbert to obtain a second check from West 
13 
American so that the matter could be finally settled. (Lybbert 
affidavit/ U13/ R. 35). 
14. On November 12/ 1993 Lybbert sent a second check for 
$216.00 to Dorius along with a letter which stated/ in part: 
"Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which/ when 
added to the $15/591.42 previously tendered/ is full settlement 
of the above-referenced action." The letter also stated: 
"On October 19/ 1993 I sent you an original Notice of 
Dismissal and an original Release of Lien. Please sign the 
Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I can file 
it with the court. Please obtain Mr. Porter's signature on 
the Release of Lien/ then return it to me . . .."(Lybbert 
affidavit, 11 13 [R. 351-36], and Exhibit "F" thereto [R. 
43]). 
15. When he still had not received the notice of dismissal 
or a signed release of lien by early December Lybbert contacted 
Dorius by telephone. Dorius did not deny that a settlement had 
been reached. He merely stated that he would contact Mr. Porter. 
(Lybbert affidavit/ 1F 14, R. 36). 
16. Within a few days thereafter/ Lybbert received a letter 
from Dorius dated December 8/ 1993 stating/ in effect/ that 
Porter believed that the $3/135 offset was intended for amounts 
paid directly by West American to Pioneer Trucking. (Exhibit "G" 
to the Lybbert affidavit/ R. 44). 
17. At no time did Dorius ever state to Lybbert that he 
believed the $3/135 offset was being taken by West American for 
any reason other than as a compromise of West American1s claim 
that it expended a much greater amount to remedy the alleged 
overexcavation by Mr. Porter. To the contrary/ on more than one 
ocassion Mr. Dorius had verbally affirmed that he understood that 
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the $3/135 offset was in compromise of West American's claim to 
an offset for the alleged negligent overexcavation. (Lybbert 
affidavit/ U 15/ R. 36). 
18. As of the date appellees filed their summary judgment 
motion/ the two checks tendered by West American to Dorius in 
settlement of the action (totalling $15/807.42) had not been 
returned. (Lybbert affidavit/ IT 17/ R. 37). 
Porter did not file his own or any other affidavits in 
opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion. He did submit 
a memorandum which contained a "Statement of Disputed Facts" in 
opposition to the motion. (R. 71). The memorandum contained a 
"verification" (R. 75) whereby Porter affirmed that he had read 
the memorandum "and that upon my personal knowledge the factual 
allegations contained therein are true and correct." 
The only "factual allegation" set forth in the Statement of 
Disputed Facts portion of the memorandum was as follows: 
1. Plaintiff admits that the parties discussed settle-
ment/ but denies that any agreement was reached." 
The remainder of the Statement of Disputed Facts consisted 
of Porter's explanation of inferences that might be reached from 
the exhibits attached to Steven Lybbert's affidavit/ ^f those 
exhibits had been before the court without the context of the 
4 
affidavit testimony. 
4. The Statement of Undisputed Facts also set forth/ 
correctly/ that after the summary judgment motion was filed/ 
enclosed with a letter dated January 28/ 1994, the two checks 
tendered to settle the case were returned to appellees' attorney. 
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2. 
Those Additional Facts Presented to the Trial Court 
In Connection With Gary Porter's Motion for 
Reconsideration 
After the trial court issued its minute entry granting 
appellees' summary judgment motion/ Gary Porter filed a motion 
for reconsideration. (R. 82). The motion for reconsideration 
contained a Statement of Facts. (R 83-85). The motion for 
reconsideration also contained a "Verification" of those facts 
signed by Porter's present attorney/ Brian W. Steffensen. (R. 
89). 
Those facts tend to show that prior to the withdrawal of 
Dale Dorius as Porter's attorney/ Porter contacted Steffensen and 
asked him to review the file. Porter "indicated" that he was 
frustrated by Dorius' attempts to convince him to accept 
appellees' settlement offer. (R. 83). 
Steffensen telephoned Dorius. Dorius assured Steffensen 
that he had never finalized any settlement agreement with 
appellees. (R. 83). 
After the court entered in minute entry granting appellees' 
summary judgment motion/ Steffensen forwarded a propsoed 
affidavit to Dorius for Dorius' signature/ but Dorius wrote back 
to Steffensen declining to sign the affidavit. (R. 85). The 
letter from Dorius to Steffensen states/ in part: 
"Per your request/ enclosed please find my letter to 
Gary Porter dated December 2, 1993 which summarizes the 
settlement negotiations. Also/ enclosed please find my 
letter of December 14/ 1993 in which I specifically 
indicated to Mr. Porter that he had reneged on the 
settlement." (R. 93). 
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The December 14/ 1993 letter from Dorius to Porter/ referred 
to in Dorius1 April 14/ 1994 letter to Steffensen/ states/ in 
part: w[I]t does appear you reneged on your $3/100.00 discount." 
(R. 95). 
Only at the time Porter filed a memorandum (R. Ill) replying 
to appellees' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. 97)/ did Porter file an affidavit signed by 
Dale Dorius. That affidavit (R. 119) stated that: 
3. That there was an agreed to settlement of the 
principal amount owed to Plaintiff plus eight percent 
interest minus $3/135.00/ and Defendant would drop the 
$11/000.00 counterclaim set off. 
4. There was not a finalized agreement as to the 
amount the Defendant could offset for the Pioneer Truck 
charges. 
5. The outstanding issue is whether or not Defendant 
paid Pioneer Trucking/ and if these amounts are proper 
offsets. This appears to be the only dispute in regard to 
the settlement. 
It is appellees' contention, as discussed in the Argument 
portion of this Appellees' Brief/ that the trial court had wide 
discretion as to whether to consider facts first brought to its 
attention after it had granted summary judgment/ in determining 
whether to reconsider its ruling granting the summary judgment 
motion. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented in support of appellees1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment was sufficient to establish prima facie that the 
parties/ negotiating through their attorneys—Dale Dorius for 
Porter and Steven Lybbert for appellees—reached an accord and 
satisfaction of Gary Porter's claims. The evidence showed that 
through a series of partial agreements a final settlement was 
reached/ that checks were tendered to pay the settlement/ and 
that those checks were only rejected after appellees asked the 
court/ via a summary judgment motion/ to enforce the settlement. 
The only evidence which the trial court might consider in 
opposition to the summary judgment motion was Gary Porter's 
verification of a factual assertion that "Plaintiff admits that 
the parties discussed settlement/ but denies that any settlement 
was reached." 
Even if Porter's "verification" of that conclusory statement 
is an acceptable substitute for an affidavit/ as required by Rule 
56(e)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ that statement did not 
create a triable issue of material fact because (1) there was no 
factual showing that Porter could competently testify as to what 
his attorney/ Dale Dorius/ agreed or did not agree/ and (2) there 
was no assertion that Dorius did not have the authority to settle 
his client's claims or to accept the checks tendered in full 
settlement of the action. Porter never did raise any argument 
that he could not be bound by his attorney's acts under the 
doctrine of apparant authority. 
18 
Once the trial court granted summary judgment/ whether to 
consider additional evidence presented in connection with 
Porter's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling 
was a matter for the trial court's exercise of its discretion. 
In this case/ it was appropriate for the court not to 
consider further evidence because/ first/ none of the new 
evidence presented with the motion for reconsideration was "newly 
discovered evidence" as that term is used in Rules 59(a) and 
60(b)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ and/ second/ Dale Dorius1 
affidavit was only filed at the time Porter replied to appellees' 
memorandum in opposition to the motion for reconsideration. 
Despite Porter's present attorney's lament that Dorius would 
not provide him with a timely affidavit/ Porter never asked the 
trial court/ pursuant to Rule 56(f)/ U.R.C.P./ for time to 
convince Dorius to submit an affidavit or/ if necessary/ to take 
Dorius' deposition. 
Since Dorius' affidavit was only filed in connection with 
the motion for reconsideration (and at the time Porter filed a 
reply memorandum, at that)/ it was further a proper exercise of 
the trial court's discretion to not consider statements in that 
affidavit because those statements which might/ if timely 
presented/ have created a triable issue of material fact/ were 
contrary to assertions by Dorius in letters to Porter that Porter 
had "reneged" on an agreed-upon settlement. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. 
In Determining Whether the Trial Court Properly Granted 
Summary Judgment/ This Court Must Distinguish Between 
Facts Before the Trial Court When It Ruled on the 
Summary Judgment Motion and Facts That Were 
Only Made A Part of the Record When 
Porter Moved for Reconsideration 
Sometimes a stew made with the leftovers of two or more 
different meals tastes better than any of the original meals. So 
it is with appellant's brief. He invites this court to taste his 
"stew"/ consisting of all the evidence presented to the trial 
court in three separate servings. 
First/ Gary Porter "verified" a Statement of Disputed Facts 
(R. 60) submitted in opposition to appellees' motion for summary 
judgment. Then; some new (but not newly discovered) evidence was 
placed before the trial court when Porter moved for reconsidera-
tion of the ruling granting the summary judgment motion. (R. 
82). Finally/ further evidence—an affidavit (R. 119) signed by 
Dale Dorius—was filed by Porter along with a reply memorandum 
(R. Ill) to appellees' memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
5 
reconsideration. 
In the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant Gary A. 
Porter's Brief/ Porter has combined what little "evidence" was 
presented to the trial court in opposition to appellees' summary 
judgment motion with the evidence presented to the trial court at 
the time he moved for reconsideration of the ruling granting the 
5. As discussed below/ the affidavit did not consist of "newly 
discovered" evidence either. 
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summary judgment motion/ and with the evidence set forth in the 
affidavit of Dale Dorius filed only at the time of filing of a 
reply memorandum. By doing so/ without distinguishing what 
evidence was before the trial court whenit ruled on the summary 
judgment motion/ Porter has come up with a "palatable" argument a 
triable issue of material fact exists as to whether a settlement 
was reached as the result of the exchange of letter and telephone 
conversations between appellees' attorney and Porter's original 
attorney. 
However/ when it ruled on appellees' summary judgment 
motion/ the trial court didn't have the luxury of knowing what 
further evidence might have been available to Porter to raise a 
triable issue of material fact had he been diligent in obtaining 
it. Instead/ the trial court did as trial courts must do and 
ruled on the evidence available to it rather than speculate as to 
what other evidence might be "out there". 
As discussed in part B. of this Argument/ the "evidence" 
presented in opposition to appellees' summary judgment motion 
failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of 
material fact as to appellees' assertion that a settlement had 
been agreed upon. 
B. 
The Evidence Presented in Support of 
Appellees' Summary Judgment Motion Demonstrated 
The Existence of a Valid/ Enforceable Settlement Agreement 
"It is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of 
disputes. Such agreements under the proper circumstances may be 
summarily enforced. . . . An agreement of compromise and 
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settlement constitutes an executory accord. Since an executory 
accord 'constitutes a valid enforceable contract' basic contract 
principles affect the determination of when a settlement agree-
ment should be so enforced." Mascaro v. Davis/ 741 P.2d 938/ 942 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist/ 642 P.2d 
382/ 384 (Utah 1982). 
As with all contracts/ an accord requires a meeting of the 
minds. Petersen v. Petersen/ 709 P.2d 372/ 375 (Utah 1985). The 
accord need not be in writing as long as the intent of the 
parties and the extent and scope of their agreement is clear. 
Id. 
In this case/ the letters between appellees' attorney and 
Dale Dorius/ Porter's attorney during settlement negotiations (R. 
38-43)/ when coupled with appellees' attorney's affidavit 
testimony (R. 32-37) detailing the telephone conversations 
between him and Dorius and providing a foundation for the 
letters/ establish the following sequence of agreements that 
resulted in a binding agreement: 
First/ Porter's attorney/ Mr. Dorius/ agreed to accept a 
$3/135 offset against Porter's claims in compromise of West 
American's claim that it was entitled to an $11/500 offset as the 
result of costs incurred because of negligent overexcavation by 
Porter at the construction site. (R. 33-34; R. 39). Then the 
attorneys reached an agreement that West American would pay 8% 
interest. (R. 34). West American requested/ and Dorius agreed 
(after receiving verification of payment by West American to 
Pioneer Trucking) to a further offset against the amount of 
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Porter's invoices for amounts paid by West American to Pioneer 
Trucking which were also included on Porter's, invoices to West 
American (i.e., amounts which Pioneer billed Porter, which Porter 
passed on to West American, and which West American paid directly 
to Pioneer). (R. 34-35). The evidence demonstrates that after 
appellees' attorney sent one check for $15,591.42 to Dorius, 
appellees' attorney offered to send a second check for $216 to 
Dorius "in order to finally settle this matter." (R. 35; R. 42). 
The evidence demonstrates that during a telephone conversation 
sometime between November 5 and November 11, 1993, Dorius told 
Appellees' attorney to "obtain a second check from West American 
so that the matter could be finally settled" (Emphasis added) (R. 
35). Finally, the evidence demonstrates that the second check 
was sent to Dorius along with a letter which stated, in part: 
"Enclosed please find my client's check for $216.00 which, when 
added to the $15,591.42 previously tendered, is full settlement 
of the above-referenced action." (R. 43). 
In short, the evidence demonstrates an offer of settle-
ment (delivery of one check and an offer to send a second check 
"in order to finally settle this matter"), an acceptance of that 
offer (telephonic instruction from Dorius to appellees' attorney 
"to obtain a second check . . . so that the matter could finally 
6. Without that offset Porter would, of course, been unjustly 
enriched. He would have received the benefit of sub-contract 
work by Pioneer without paying for it. Conversely, without the 
offset West American would pay twice for the same work. 
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be settled")/ and delivery of that additional check (constituting 
the "satisfaction" portion of the accord and satisfaction). 
It is of no legal consequence that the parties did not sign 
a settlement agreement. Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems/ 
supra# 866 P.2d 581. "It is a basic and long-established 
principle of contract law that agreements are enforceable even 
though there is neither a written memorialization of that agree-
ment nor the signatures of the parties/ unless specifically 
required by the statute of frauds." Murray v. State/ 737 P.2d 
1000, 1001 (Utah 1987). "Parties have no right to welch on a 
settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between 
when the deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be 
garnered on a stipulation." Brown v. Brown, supra/ 744 P.2d at 
336 (Orme/ J. dissenting). Neither does a party have a right to 
welch on a settlement agreement during the period between "when 
the deal is struck" and a plaintiff's attorney signs and files a 
notice or stipulation of dismissal. 
In the Argument portion of his brief/ Porter attacks the 
sufficiency of the "Undisputed Facts" set forth in the memorandum 
appellees submitted in support of their summary judgment motion. 
Porter states that "[n]owhere in these six paragraphs does West 
American state that a final agreement was reached which is 
binding upon Porter." That there was a binding final agreement 
reached is/ of course/ the conclusion appellees wanted the trial 
court to reach from the predicate facts established in the 
affidavit of their attorney and the exhibits to that affidavit. 
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c. 
Gary Porter Failed to Present Any Evidence Which 
Refuted the Evidence Presented in Support 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment 
In opposition to appellees1 summary judgment motion/ Porter 
set forth a "Statement of Disputed Facts" (R. 71)/ which he 
"verified". (R. 74). Even assuming the "verification" was a 
sufficient substitute for an affidavit/ the verified "facts" did 
not demonstrate the existence of a triable dispute over whether 
Dale Dorius agreed to settle the case. 
Paragraphs 2.(a), 2.(b), 2.(c) and 2.(d) of the "Statement 
of Disputed Facts" do no more than suggest what the letters 
attached as exhibits to appellees' attorney's affidavit might 
infer/ ij[ those exhibits were before the court without the 
foundation of the affidavit testimony. Porter's "verification" 
set forth no foundation. Paragraph 2.(d) states that "the 
plaintiff nver acknowledged in writing or otherwise that these 
counter-proposals were acceptable." (Emphasis added). Porter 
himself did not/ but his attorney/ Dale Dorius/ did. Appellees' 
attorney's affidavit states clearly: "Sometime between November 
5 and November 11, 1993 . . . [Dorius] instructed me to obtain a 
second check from West American so that the matter could be 
finally settled." (R. 35). 
That leaves paragraph 1. of the Statement of Disputed Facts. 
(R. 71). Porter verified the statement: "Plaintiff admits that 
the parties discussed settlement/ but denies that any agreement 
was reached." The question, then/ is does that conclusory 
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statement give rise to a triable issue of material fact. The 
answer is negative. 
The assertion that "[p]laintiff . . . denies that any 
agreement was reached" is nothing more than a conclusion of law. 
A settlement agreement is a contract. Petersen v. Petersen/ 
supra/ 709 P.2d 375; Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems/ 
supra/ 866 P.2d 581. The essential elements of a contract are 
parties competent to contract, a proper subject matter, legal 
consideration/ mutuality of agreement (a "meeting of the minds") 
and mutuality of obligation, Mallory v. City of Detroit/ 419 
N.W.2d 115/ 118 (Mich.App. 1989). Appellees1 attorney's 
affidavit and the exhibits to the affidavit set forth predicate 
facts sufficient to establish each of those elements. Porter's 
conclusory assertion denying that "any agreement was reached" 
does not dispute any predicate fact set forth in the affidavit as 
supplemented by the exhibits. 
When evidence as to the elements of a contract is 
conflicting or admits of more than one inference/ it is an issue 
of fact whether a contract exists. O'Hara v. Hall/ 628 P.2d 
1289, 1291 (Utah 1981). Conversely, when there is no conflict as 
to the evidence relating to the elements of a contract, the 
question whether the undisputed facts establish the existence of 
a contract is one of law. As stated in Cortland Asbestos Prod., 
Inc. v. J. & K. Plumb. & H. Co., 304 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1969): 
" . . . while the existence of a contract is a question 
of fact, the question of whether a certain or undisputed 
state of facts establishes a contract is one of law for the 
courts and, thus, since the facts herein are undisputed, the 
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question whether there was a contract is for the court." 
304 N.Y.S.2d at 696. 
Not only is the assertion "[p]laintiff . . . denies that any 
agreement was reached" a mere conclusion but/ as the trial court 
pointed out in its minute entry granting the motion (R. 76-81 
[included in the Addendum hereto]): 
"The plaintiff's response does not include any sworn 
testimony of the plaintiff's prior counsel [Mr. Dorius] or 
the plaintiff/ either suggesting that Mr. Dorius did not 
have the authority to accept the settlement offer on behalf 
of the plaintiff/ or that Mr. Dorius did not as the 
Affidavit of Mr. Lybbert alleges/ accept the settlement 
proposal between the dates of November 5 and November 11/ 
1993." 
The court correctly took note of the absence of any evidence 
that Mr. Dorius did not have authority to accept the settlement 
offer he did. Porter's conclusory assertion that no agreement 
was reached/ is totally insufficient to establish a foundation 
for Porter to testify (or verify) as to what his attorney did or 
did not do or say. Porter presented no argument—at either the 
trial court or in his brief before this court—that he is not 
"bound by his [attorney's] acts under the doctrine of apparant 
7 
authority." Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems/ supra/ 866 
P.2d at 584. 
Clearly/ in light of the "evidence" offered in opposition to 
appellees' summary judgment motion—a statement which was in fact 
7. An attorney is his client's agent. Unlike other situations 
where agents deal with each other/ the Rules of Professional 
Conduct preclude an attorney from contacting his client's 
adversary in order to ask: "Does your attorney have authority to 
settle this case?" 
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nothing more than a conclusion of law—the trial court correctly 
granted the motion. 
D. 
It Was Within the Proper Exercise of the 
Trial Court's Discretion to Deny Gary Porter's 
Motion for Reconsideration 
Whether Gary Porter's motion for reconsideration of the 
trial court's ruling granting appellees' summary judgment motion 
was pursuant to Rule 59(a), Rule 60(b) or Rule 52(b), it was 
based on what he terms "new evidence." However, it is clear that 
the "new evidence" was not "newly discovered" evidence. 
"Evidence must meet several requirements to qualify as newly 
discovered evidence . . . . In Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 841 (Utah 1984), we stated that the moving 
party must show that the evidence has three characteristics in 
order for a new trial to be granted. First, it must be material, 
competent evidence which is in fact newly discovered. Second, it 
must be such that it could not, by due diligence, have been 
discovered and produced at trial." In Interest of S.R., 735 P.2d 
53, 57-58 (Utah 1987). 
Only after the trial court ruled on and granted appellees' 
summary judgment motion did Porter decide the time was right to 
disclose communications between himself and his present attorney, 
between his present attorney and Dale Dorius, and between himself 
and Dorius which occurred prior to the time Porter filed his 
opposition to the summary judgment motion. 
The affidavit of Dale Dorius [R. 119], upon which Porter 
relies almost exclusively in his brief as "proof" that the trial 
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court abused its discretion in not setting aside the summary 
judgment/ was filed only at the time Porter filed a reply 
memorandum (R. Ill) to appellees' memorandum (R. 97) in 
opposition to the motion for reconsideration. 
It was within the proper exercise of the trial court's 
discretion not to grant the motion for reconsideration despite 
Dorius1 affidavit for several reasons. First/ as discussed above/ 
the affidavit was not timely. When he filed his motion for 
reconsideration/ Porter complained about the refusal of Dorius 
(up to that point) to provide an affidavit. He even attached an 
affidavit which Dorius had declined to sign as an exhibit to his 
motion for reconsideration. However/ Porter never did file an 
affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ 
requesting additional time to obtain Dorius' affidavit or to take 
his deposition. 
Second/ the assertions of fact in the affidavit were not 
"newly discovered" evidence. The evidence before the court 
demonstrated that only after the court ruled on the summary 
judgment motion did Porter's attorney request an affidavit from 
Dorius. (R. 93 [a letter from Dorius to Porter's present 
attorney dated April 14/ 1994 stating/ in part: "I am advised 
the court has already granted summary judgment/ and prior to same 
you never requested an affidavit or any input from my office."]). 
The statement in Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials/ Inc./ 576 P.2d 
174/ 176 (Utah 1977)/ that "the evidentiary matters termed as new 
were reasonable and proper subjects of discovery and could have 
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been obtained by the exercise of ordinary diligence" applies 
equally to this action. 
Third/ at the time Dorius1 affidavit was filed/ there was 
before the court/ filed as exhibits to the motion for reconsider-
ation/ convincing evidence that Dorius did indeed believe a 
settlement had been reached. In the same letter quoted in the 
preceding paragraph (R. 93)/ Dorius wrote: "Enclosed please find 
my letter of December 14/ 1993 in which I specifically indicated 
to Mr. Porter that he had reneged on the settlement." The 
December 14/ 1993 letter from Dorius to Porter (R. 95) states/ in 
part: "From the correspondence regarding settlement of this case 
it does appear you reneged on your $3/100.00 discount." 
It even appears that at this time/ in his brief/ Porter is 
attempting to introduce new (but not "newly discovered") 
evidence. Exhibits D [a letter from Dorius to Porter]/ E [a 
letter from Porter to Dorius] and H [another letter from Dorius 
to Porter] to the addendum to Porter's brief appear not to be 
part of the record in this action. Appellees submit that 
Porter's use in the addendum to his brief of correspondence not a 
part of the record/ while ignoring letters from Dorius in which 
Dorius expressed his opinion that Porter had reneged on a settle-
ment/ is telling of Porter's lack of diligence in presenting to 
the trial court all evidence which might tend to create a triable 
issue of material fact. 
Given the lack of diligence in obtaining a timely affidavit 
from Dorius/ or in taking his deposition/ and given that Dorius' 
affidavit seems to contradict statements made in letters from 
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Dorius to Porter and to his present attorney/ it was certainly an 
appropriate exercise of the trial court's discretion to deny 
Porter's motion for reconsideration. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above/ and on the record in this action/ 
appellees respectfully submit that the summary judgment entered 
herein was properly granted/ and Gary Porter's motion for recon-
sideration of the ruling granting that motion was properly 
denied. The summary judgment/ and the order denying Porter's 
motion for reconsideration/ should both be affirmed. 
Appellees should be awarded their costs. Rule 34/ Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Dated this / / day of February/ 1995. 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Appellees West 
American Finance Corporation 
and Olympus Bank 
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ADDENDUM 
Affidavit of Steven H, Lybbert in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (and exhibits thereto) (but 
excluding certificate of service) [R. 32-44] 
Minute Entry (ruling on motion for summary judgment) 
[R. 76-81] 
Minute Entry (denying motion for reconsideration) [R. 130] 
Summary Judgment (Judgment of Dismissal) [R. 132-133] 
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STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 302 Fe: 
341 South Ma: 
Salt Lake City, 
Telephone: (801) 363-0890 
> ^ 
'elt Building /)<T>J MAJUJ" 
lain Street l/^^fJi^P^ 
:ity, Utah 84111 ^>4 ' ' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY A. PORTER dba PORTER & ) 
SON'S CONSTRUCTION, ) 
PJaintiff, ] 
vs. 
WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation, and 
OLYMPUS BANK, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN H. 
1 LYBBERT IN SUPPORT OF 
1 DEFENDANTS 1 MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Case No. 930902266 CV 
) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Steven H. Lybbert, being first duly sworn upon oath, states: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in Utah. I am 
the attorney of record for defendants in the above-entitled 
action. 
2. This action involves plaintiff's claim to foreclose on a 
mechanic's lien for excavation work performed by plaintiff at the 
site of construction of a condominium complex being developed by 
defendant West American Finace Corporation. 
3. Following service of summonses upon defendants in this 
action, Stephen M. Harmsen, president of defendant West American 
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Finance/ and I met with Gary A. Porter and his attorney/ Dale M. 
Dorius/ at my office to discuss settlement of the action. The 
meeting took place on August 24, 1993. 
3. At that meeting the parties reviewed invoices from 
plaintiff to West American's construction manager and discussed 
West American's claim that as a result of negligent overexcava-
tion at the construction site/ it was necessary for West American 
to expend about $11,500 for extra shoring and extra engineering 
that would not have been necessary but for the alleged negligent 
overexcavation. Stephen Harmsen expressed his willingness to 
settle Mr. Porter's mechanic's lien claim if a compromise could 
be reached as to an appropriate set off for that extra shoring 
and engineering. 
4. Following that meeting, Mr. Dorius and I discussed 
settlement several times by telephone. On behalf of defendants, 
I proposed that defendants pay the full amount of Mr. Porter's 
claim, less a $3,135 set off for the extra work described above, 
less amounts billed by Porter to West American for amounts billed 
by Pioneer Trucking to Porter (and in turn billed by Porter to 
West American) which had been paid directly by West American to 
Pioneer Trucking. I confirmed that settlement offer in a letter 
to Mr. Dorius dated August 31, 1993. A copy of my August 31/ 
1993 letter to Mr. Dorius is attached hereto and marked as 
Exhibit "A". 
5. By letter to me also dated August 31, 1993, Mr. Dorius 
accepted the $3,135.00 offset amount. A copy of Mr. Dorius' 
2 
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August 31, 1993 letter to me is attached hereto and Marked as 
Exhibit "B". 
6. After August 31, 1993 Mr- Dorius and I negotiated by 
telephone concerning the remaining items of damage—a rate of 
interest on the principal amount to be paid by defendants and Mr. 
Dorius1 attorney fees-
7. By September 27, 1993 Mr. Dorius and I had agreed that 
defendants would pay 8% interest from the date the mechanic's 
lien was filed until the claim was paid. 
8. A few days prior to October 19, 1993 Mr. Dorius advised 
me by telephone that Mr. Porter would accept the principal amount 
previously agreed upon (the principal amount of Porter's billings 
to West American less a $3/500 set off/ less amounts paid by West 
American directly to Pioneer trucking)/ plus 8% interest/ and 
that each side would assume his or its own attorney fees. 
9. On October 19/ 1993 I mailed West American's check for 
$15,591.42 to Mr. Dorius. A copy of the letter from me to Mr. 
Dorius with which that check was enclosed is attached hereto and 
marked as Exhibit "C". Also enclosed with that letter was a 
sheet of paper entitled Gary Porter Settlement/ prepared by Mr. 
Harmsen of West American, which contained the calculations as to 
how the amount of $15,591.42 was reached. 
10. Sometime between October 19 and October 28, 1993 I had a 
further telephone discussion with Mr. Dorius. He stated that his 
client wanted verification of an amount paid by West American 
directly to Pioneer Trucking. He also stated that his client had 
3 
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concerns about a few of the other amounts set forth on the sheet 
entitled Gary Porter Settlement. A couple of invoice amounts as 
set forth on the Gary Porter Settlement calculation varied from 
the actual amounts on the invoices. 
11. On October 28, 1993 I faxed a letter to Mr. Dorius with 
copies of the front and back of a check from West American 
payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel. I also acknowledged my lack of 
understanding about the invoice amount variances set forth on the 
Gary Porter Settlement calculation and acknowledged that some 
further amount of money might be payable by my clients to 
"finally resolve this matter." I stated my intent to discuss 
those amounts with Mr. Harmsen when he returned from "out of 
town." A copy of my October 28/ 1993 letter to Mr. Dorius is 
attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "D." 
12. On November 5, 1993 I faxed another letter to Mr. Dorius 
in which I addressed his concerns about those invoice amount 
variances, and stated my view that another $216.00 ($200 
principal and $16 interest) was payable "in order to finally 
settle this matter." A copy of my November 5, 1993 letter to Mr. 
Dorius is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "E." 
13. Sometime between November 5 and November 11/ 1993 I 
again discussed the matter with Mr. Dorius by telephone. He 
instructed me to obtain a second check from West American so that 
the matter could be finally settled. On November 12/ 1993 I sent 
a second check for $216.00 to Mr. Dorius along with a letter 
which stated, in part: "Enclosed please find my client's check 
for $216.00 which, when added to the $15,591.42 previously 
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tendered/ is full settlement of the above-referenced action." A 
copy of my November 12/ 1993 letter to Mr. Dorius is attached 
hereto and marked as Exhibit "F". 
14. When I still had not received a Stipulation of Dismissal 
and a signed Release of Lien by early December I contacted Mr. 
Dorius by telephone. Mr. Dorius did not deny that a settlement 
had been reached. He merely stated that he would contact Mr. 
Porter. Within a few days thereafter/ I received a letter from 
Mr. Dorius dated December 8/ 1993 stating, in effect/ that his 
client believed that the $3/135 offset was for amounts paid 
directly by West American to Pioneer Trucking. A copy of Mr. 
Dorius's December 8/ 1993 letter is attached hereto and marked as 
Exhibit "G." 
15. At no time has Mr. Dorius ever stated that he believed 
the $3,135 offset was being taken by West American (and granted 
by Mr. Porter) for any reason other than as a compromise of West 
American's claim that it expended a much greater amount to remedy 
the a I I oijud ne«j I njunL uvuLcxcavatiun by Mr. Porter. To the 
contrary, on more than one occasion Mr. Dorius verbally affirmed 
that he understood that the $3/135 offset was in compromise of 
West American's claim to an offset for the alleged negligent 
excavation. In view of the fact that there could hardly be a 
dispute about West American's right to a credit for amounts paid 
directly to Pioneer Trucking (which amounts exceeded $7,600)/ it 
is patently unreasonable for Mr. Porter to believe that the 
$3,135 setoff was a credit for a much larger amount paid by West 
American directly to Pioneer Trucking. 
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16. I submit that Mr. Porter has either (a) had second 
thoughts about agreeing to a set off, or (b) decided to take 
advantage of the leverage he possesses as holder of a mechanic's 
lien in terms of West American's ability to sell condominiums at 
the construction site without obtaining a release of the lien/ in 
order to extract still further sums from West American. 
17. As of this date (this affidavit is being prepared on 
January 17, 1994) the two checks tendered by West American to Mr. 
Dorius in settlement of this action (totalling $15,807.42) have 
not been cu!:ui:ned. 
Dated this If ;" day of January, 1994. 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Defendants 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by Steven H. Lybbert, 
whose identity is known to me, this j % day of January, 1994. 
r~~— 
i H M i u. L r40017*"'*"! i Notary Public residing LrtTSalt 
»\^3^ ':'^^\^'l Lake Jounty, Utah ^ 
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AT1TJRN1SY AT LAW 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
Ml South Main Street 
Suit l^ike City, Utuli 84111 
Telephone: (801) 3G3-G890 
\iliiiliicd also in Culifomiu Telecopier. (801) 1163-8512 
August 31/ 1993 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City, UT B4302 
R e :
 Cary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp., et al» 
Dear Dale: 
This is to confirm the settlement offer I made on behalf of 
the defendants in the above-entitled action, and to memorialize 
the continuing extension of time to respond to the complaint as 
per our telephone conversation this morning. 
West American Finance Company is willing to pay $3,135 less 
than the full amount of Mr. Porter's billings in full settlement 
of his action. I assume that means that West American would pay 
$22,405 less any amount it paid directly to Pioneer Trucking for 
amounts billed by Mr. Porter. 
The offer is extremely reasonable in view of the fact that 
if this matter is litigated West American will assert a right to 
a set off for approximately $11,500 for the cost of extra shoring 
and extra engineering caused by what West American perceives as 
your clients crew's negligent over-excavation at the job site. 
You were kind enough to confirm that I have a continuing 
open extension of time to answer the complaint on behalf of both 
defendants, West American and Olympus Bank, at least until your 
client responds to the settlement offer. If we cannot settle the 
case promptly, I will file an answer for the defendants within 
five days of your request that I do so. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Very truly yours, 
Steven H. Lybbert 
SL:cd:36A 
cc: Steve Harmsen 
B l a k e T . l l e i n e r 
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Dale M. Dorius 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MAIN OFFICE 
P O Box 895 
29 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
BRIGHAM CITY. UTAH 84302 
18011 7 2 3 5219 
BRANCH OFFICE 
P.O Box 720 
47 MAIN STREET 
GUNNISON. UTAH 84034 
I80U 5 2 8 7 2 9 0 
AOMITTIO: 
UTAH STATC BAM I198S) 
CALIFORNIA STATC 8AM 119681 
COLOAAOO STATC BAH 119881 
August 31, 1993 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Porter & Son's Construction vs. West American Finance 
Corporation, et al. 
Dear Mr. Lybbert: 
Per your offer of settlement 
submit the following. 
my client has authorized me to 
My client would be willing to accept $25,600.00 minus offset of 
$3,135.00 on condition your client pay him interest at the legal 
rate of interest of ten percent (10%) from the date of filing the 
Notice of Lien October 30, 1992 and $1,500.00 towards his 
attorney fees. 
This counteroffer will be open for a period of ten (10) days and 
if not accepted will thereafter be withdrawn. Please advise. 
Very: f^ ruly yours, ylik 
Dale M. D o r i u s 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
DMD:jp 
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jL^jiyaWtl iVl L A W 
Sui te 3 0 2 Fel t Bui lding 
3 4 1 S o u d i Main S t r e e t 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 1 1 
Telephone: (801) 3 6 3 - 0 8 9 0 
AdmiUcd ulbo la California Telecopier: (801) 3 6 3 - 8 5 1 2 
October 19, 1993 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Re: Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp., et al> 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed please find my client's check for $15#591.42 in 
full settlement of the above-referenced action. 
Also enclosed is a sheet entitled Gary Porter Settlement 
specifiying how the amount of the check was calculated and copies 
of the two checks showing payment of amounts by West American 
directly to Pioneer Sand & Gravel which were included on Mr. 
Porter•s invoices. 
Also enclosed is a Notice of Dismissal. Assuming you and 
Mr. Porter find the numbers to be in order, once the check clears 
please sign the Notice of Dismissal and return it to me so that I 
can file it with the court. 
Finally/ please find a Release of Lien which I would like 
Mr. Porter to sign. Once he has signed the Release of Lien# 
please return it to me so that I can file it with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's office. 
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or 
concerns. 
Very truly yours# 
Steven H. Lybbert 
SL:cd:43A 
Enclosures 
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen 
Blake T. lleiner 
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STEVEN II. LYBBERT 
AITORNEYATLAW 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801 )3(>3-08<)0 
Admitted ulso in CulUonilu Telecopier: (HOI) 303-8512 
October 28/ 1993 
VIA FAX 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City/ UT 84302 
Re: Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al. 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed please find a copy of the front and back of West 
American's check number 001018 payable to Pioneer Sand & Gravel. 
It appears to me that the check was deposited in Pioneer Sand & 
Gravel's account at Draper Bank & Trust on December 3/ 1992. 
Also enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter 
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter to you. 
The column of numbers on the far right are mine. After 
recalculating interest, it appears that West American may still 
owe $637.20. Mr. Harmsen is out of town. I will need to check 
with him to determine why he did not add in the amount of 
"invoice #8", why he listed "invoice #3" at $2/093.75 rather than 
at $2/633.75, and why he listed "invoice #5" at $6/107.50 rather 
than at $6/157.50. If the discrepancies were clerical mistakes/ 
I will urge him to cut another check for $637.20 so that we can 
finally resolve this matter. 
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or 
concerns. 
Very truly yours, 
Steven H. Lybbert 
SL:cd:43B 
Enclosures 
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen 
Blake T. Heiner 
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STEVEN II. LYBBERT 
ATTORNEY AT I AW 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 303-0890 
/Ydmitted also in Cullforniu Telecopier: (801) 363-8512 
November 5/ 1993 
VIA FAX 
Dale M. Dorius/ Esq. 
P.O. Box 895 
Brigham City/ UT 84302 
Re: Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al» 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed is the same document entitled Gary Porter 
Settlement which I enclosed with my October 19 letter and my 
October 28 letter to you. I have now had an opportunity to 
discuss the discrepancies in invoice numbers 3/ 5 and 8 with 
Steve Harmsen. 
Mr. Harmsen listed invoice #3 at $2/093.75 rather than at 
$2/633.75 because the next to last line of invoice #2 (the one 
dated "Tues 9-15" contains a $540 charge to pioneer truck for 12 
loads at $540.00. The first line of invoice #3 (the one dated 
9-16-92) is the same charge. In other words/ invoice numbers 2 
and 3 contain a $540.00 double billing. 
Mr. Harmsen listed "invoice #5" at $6/107.50 rather than at 
$6/157.50 because the fourth item on that invoice (the one dated 
9-9-92) is for 11^ hours at $100 per hour/ but the "balance" 
column states $1,200.00. It should only be $1/150.00. 
By my calculations. West American Finance owes another 
$216.00 ($200 principal and $16 interest) in order to finally 
settle this matter. Please consult with Mr. Porter. If that is 
acceptable/ please contact me and T will promptly forward a check 
in that amount. Don't hesitate to call me if you have any 
questions or concerns. 
Very truly yours/ 
Steven H. Lybbert 
SL:cd:43C 
Enclosures 
cc: Stephen M. Harmsen 
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i\i 1UKNUY AT LAW 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
Ml South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841.11 
Admitted also in California Telecopier: (801) 363-8512 
November 12/ 1993 
Dal£ M. Dorius/ Esq. 
P.O* Box 895 
Bri^ham City, UT 84302 
Re: Gary Porter etc. v. West American Finance Corp./ et al. 
Dear Dale: 
Enclosed please find my client'3 check for $216.00 which/ 
when added to the $15/591.42 previou3ly tendered/ is full settle-
ment of the above-referenced action. 
On October 19, 1993 I sent you an original Notice of 
Ois^vasal s^\d a><\ ocigiueA R^\<^s^ ot Uiecw Pl^aaeL aiqa the 
Notice of Dismissal and return it to nie so that I can file it 
with the court. Please obtain Mr. porter's signature on the 
Release of Lien, then return it to me so that I can record it 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. 
Don't hesitate to call me if you have any questions or 
concerns. 
Very truly yours/ 
Steven H. Lybbert 
SL:cd:43D 
Enclosure 
cci Stephen M. Harmsen 
Blake T. Heiner 
LJciic M. uonus 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
BRANCH OFFICE 
PO Box 7 2 6 
4 7 M A I N STftCCT 
GUNNISON UTAH 84634 
I80U 5 2 8 7 2 9 6 
MAIN OFFICE 
P O Box 895 
29 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
BRIGHAM CITY. UTAH 84302 
(8011 723 5219 
AOMITTCO 
UTAH STATE BAA (19051 
CALIFORNIA STATE BAN 11968) 
COLORADO STATC BAR 1I96B) 
December 8, 1993 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Porter & Son's Construction vs, 
Corporation, et al. 
West American Finance 
Dear Mr. Lybbert: 
My client indicates he understood the agreement to be that he 
would give credit for the $3,100.00 that had been paid to 
Pioneer. My client indicates he did not understand he would be 
reducing his sum approximately $3,100.00 from the principal owed 
plus the payment made to Pioneer. 
My client at this point is not agreeable to the settlement. He 
indicates he will only accept the full amount of principal plus 
interest at 8% from date of lien; or in the alternative, you may 
reduce the principal sum and interest of $3,100.00 if you will 
pay his attorney fees in the sum of $2,593.60. 
If this counteroffer 
within 10 days. 
Vex^ y truly yours, 
Dale M. DorKis 
Attorney at L^w 
DMD:]p 
is not accepted, please file your answer 
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Vi A. PORTER, dba PORTER & SON'S : 
NISTRUCTION, 
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iv-remhor HT 199M from Mr. Dorius. plaintiff's former counsel, to Mr. 
i yhherf,. defendant's prosent. counsel, to suggest that an agreement had not 
fir-i-'n rrarhed , hut i hr re i s no i nd i rati on La t h n t letter that Mr. Dorius on 
behalf of the pi MIw\ ] ft did not agree to the settlement as alleged—in the 
sworn testimony or Mr. Lvhhort , ____ 
LJ is cl^ar uiai there were ongoing negotiations between the parties. 
j he AtTidavi r of M^. LYbbert snows that Mr, Dorius accepted—what appeared 
DLL the final o f fer of Mr. l.yhbert on behalf of his clients in November 
-r i99.fi. at whirh v ime Mr. l.ybbert caused his client to issue certain 
>.\rr.fro c,n ;>x Tc. TI-.J:^ thn^.P p y m p n K . Li is a 1 s o i n s t r u e t i v e t o n o t p t h a t 
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DATE: 
JUDGE 
Accordirmiv, in face of the lack of evidence to the contrary, 
oo fondants' position of the racts in connection with this Summary Judgment 
must bo accented hv this Court, because there LS no dispute to Mr.. 
i.vhhert.'s allegations that Mr. borius accepted the settlement on behalf of 
his client. There* hoiim' no disputed issues of fact, the Court is 
x.Misiiod that the parties did in fact reach a settlement agreement based 
upon arm's ir-n^ lli negotiations, that it was the intent of the parties 
lnrouuh their respective agents to settle the matter as suggested in 
defendants' counsel's Affidavit and the correspondence, and that the 
amounts of settien,enr were tendered to plaintiff's counsel. The fact that 
the checks have now been returned when the question of retention of the 
checks was raiseo in the Motion for Summary Judgment further suggests to 
r r . i s C o u r t t h a r t i e w i t h ho 1 d i irJ n f t h e s e t t l e m e n t p r o c e e d s b y p l a i n t i f f ' s 
; . » r i o r c o u n s e l l o t i ho l e n g t h y p e r i o d o f t i m e t h a t h e d i d , e v e n a f t e r a 
• • • u n r e s t i o n t h ; , i h -. e l i e n t w a s n o t w i l l i tlfi 1 3 a c c e p t t h e a g r e e d u p o n 
s e t t l e m e n t a l l s n o \ s t h i s I ' n u r t t h a t a s e t t l e m e n t w a s r e a c h e d , a n d t h a t 
urc-i-) r d a n d s a r i s f a c t i o n h a s t>ep f ) h f l d « 
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.Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be granted. Inasmuch as the checks representing 
iho settlement agreement have apparently now been returned to defendants' 
TninselT those cheeks are to be resubmitted to plaintiff's counsel for the 
pininrif f''s use and benefit. If the checks are now non-negotiable because 
of the passflffi of i lino, the checks are to be redrafted. Should plaintiff 
rhoose to reject the checks now that the Court has granted Summary 
Judgment, the defendant is authorized to place those funds with the clerk 
of the court for payment to the pLaintiff when the plaintiff should choose 
to accent the same. 
Counsel for the defendants is to prepare an appropriate Order in 
•onformitv with this Minute Entry decision> and submit the same to the 
nnrt for review and signature pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
•vdmirri st rat ion. in preparing the Order, the Court draws counsel's 
• rrention to Rule :V-M a ) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, indicating 
--Com Inned" 
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that the order should contain the basis uj^ On which the Summary Judgment is 
; ranted 
' I MOTH Y \\. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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In the Third District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
GARY A. PORTER, DBA PORTER & 
SONS CONSTRUCTION, 
vs. 
WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORP, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 930902266 CV 
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson 
Clerk: Evelyn Thompson 
Date: June 22, 1994 
ATP: Brian W. Steffensen 
ATD: Steven H. Lybbert 
Before the Court, is plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the Court's granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and defendant's objection thereto. The matter 
has properly been submitted under rule 4-501, cja. 
The Court has reviewed the documents submitted by counsel, and otherwise being 
fully advised, denies the motion. Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order based on the 
Court's ruling. 
cc: Brian W. Steffensen 
Steven Lybbert 
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STEVEN H. LYBBERT, Bar No. 4187 
Attorney for Defendants 
Suite 302 Felt Building 
341 South Mam Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0890 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH 
GARY A. PORTER dba PORTER & ) 
SON'S CONSTRUCTION/ ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
WEST AMERICAN FINANCE CORPORA-
TION/ a Utah corporation/ and 
OLYMPUS BANK, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL) 
I Case No. 930902266 CV 
) Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
On May 9, 1994 the court entered its Order Granting Motion 
for Summary Judgment/ granting the motion for summary judgment 
filed by defendants. The motion was made on the ground that an 
accord and satisfaction had been reached between the parties and/ 
among other things, directed defendants to resubmit to plaintiff 
$15,807.42 previously tendered to plaintiff in satisfaction of 
the accord. 
On April 12, 1994 defendants did submit a check to 
plaintiff's attorney for $15,807.42 and thereby complied with the 
terms of the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On this date the court entered its Order denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Reconsideration of the order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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Based thereon, and good cause appearing/ 
IT IS ORDERED/ ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
and hereby is granted in favor of defend 
plaintiff and this action is dismissed. 
Dated this /% day of 
mary judgment be 
against 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on June 24/ 1994 a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT was 
mailed/ by first class mail/ postage prepaid/ and addressed to: 
Brian W. Steffensen/ Esq. 
Huntsman Building/ Suite 200 
3760 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City/ UT 84106 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on February /~7 / 1995 
two copies of the foregoing Appellees' Brief were mailed* by 
first class mail/ postage prepaid/ to: 
Brian W. Steffensen/ Esq. 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. 
675 East 2100 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Appellees 
